

THE LINGUISTICALITY¹ OF GLOSSOLALIA

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*Definitions*²

The term *glossolalia*,³ as commonly used, applies both to a particular kind of linguistic event and also to the religious experience with which it is associated. This is for many people by definition a Christian experience, because it is identified with *speaking in tongues* referred to in the New Testament. Whether or not the event is an actual recurrence of the early phenomenon, as is claimed by the glossolalists, is immaterial to the linguistic investigator, who is more interested in the linguistic phenomenon than in the belief system associated with it.⁴

The public defines the experience, linguistically, by the fact, or the belief, that a person under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit utters a language totally unknown to himself. It may be a known language, whether now spoken (like Zulu, Chinese, Cherokee, or Finnish) or now extinct (like ancient Aramaic, Etruscan, or Egyptian), or an unknown language. Whatever else may be believed about the function of this "miraculous gift," as they put it (that is, speaking a language one had not learned), it is clear that for the glossolalist it authenticates, by giving evidence to, a religious experience.⁵ Being "filled with the Spirit" implies, among other things, having spoken some unknown language.

The circularity implicit in the definition (that is, defining the religious experience linguistically and the linguistic phenomenon religiously) embarrasses no one but the objective investigator. There are other forms of religious behavior, some of them non-Christian in the

strict sense of the term, which very closely resemble charismatic behavior—particularly in groups—but which have no glossolalia. There are linguistic phenomena, on the other hand, which appear to be identical to at least some forms of Christian glossolalia but which are not associated with anything religious, as we generally use that term.⁶

The most remarkable, but not the only, case of non-Christian and nonreligious glossolalia is that of Albert Le Baron whose personal record, under this pseudonym, was submitted to the American Society for Psychical Research in the last century by William James (Le Baron 1896-1897). In this clinical self-analysis we read that Le Baron had been getting messages from what he called his "psychic automatism" in English; they even carried on conversations. Then one Sunday morning, during one of these private conversations in his hotel room, another "language" replaced English. Because he wrote down many of the messages he got on subsequent occasions, along with their translations (from the same psychic automatism), we are able to compare Le Baron's glossolalia with samples from Americans today. They are, in my opinion, so much alike that we must accept all as manifestations of the same linguistic phenomenon.

Having to specify glossolalia as religious or nonreligious and as Christian or non-Christian is awkward, but the term glossolalia is so useful in talking about certain kinds of linguistic behavior, irrespective of their nonlinguistic contexts, that it probably should be retained. But it should not be so general that it includes *xenoglossia*, that is, demonstrating knowledge of a language one has not learned in the normal ways. The phenomenon is included in the Christian definition of glossolalia, as given above, but the term itself is not in vogue among charismatists. The phenomenon, moreover, is not restricted to Christian groups. For example it has been reported among Muslims in India where certain individuals are said to have recited portions of the Koran in its original language, Arabic, without having previously learned them.

Xenoglossia has been frequently reported in nonreligious contexts. Some of the cases have been rather well studied, particularly by psychologists and investigators of psychic phenomena⁷ (e.g., Bozzano, Hulme and Wood, and Wood). The word, in fact, is supposed to have been coined by Charles Richet (as *xenoglossie* in French) at the turn of the century when he reported on his investigation of "automatic

writing in foreign languages" to the London Society for Psychical Research.

There are some forms of verbal behavior which should be excluded from the meaning of glossolalia, for the danger is that so much may be comprehended by it that the word will fail in its function as a technical term.⁸ Therefore all that has been called glossolalia is not similar. There is a great difference between what we shall describe in this study and an utterance like

*Dji-dji-dji-dji-dji-dji,
Hallelujah, Hallelujah,
Do-do-do-do-d [sic] -do-do-do,
Zzzzzzzzzz,
Amen.*

This does not become glossolalia simply because it was uttered for two minutes by a woman in a Zionist meeting (a Pentecostalist kind of separatist religion) in East Africa, whose behavior had many trance features (Sundkler 1961:248).⁹

Even in textbooks on psychology one finds definitions too broad for our purposes. For example: ". . . the entranced submission to some obsessive gibberish under the illusion of being inspired by mystical 'tongues,' which are thought to come from heaven" (Luchsinger *et al.* 1965:790). Someone else defines glossolalia as being creations of language by the insane, in which the patient utters sounds which he feels to be full of meaning, but which he can seldom repeat when asked to do so. If the utterances referred to by these writers prove to be systematically similar to those encountered in Christian glossolalia, we would have to recognize them as being glossolalic. But the criteria implied in these definitions are not rigorous enough: namely, that the utterances are unintelligible and that the speakers attribute to them a divine source.

A definition of glossolalia which would be useful to the linguist in the widest contexts is one like the following: *A meaningless but phonologically structured human utterance believed by the speaker to be a real language but bearing no systematic resemblance to any natural language, living or dead.* This definition specifies three features that appear to be necessary in any definition of the phenomenon: (a) a phonological structure (that is, the kind of patterning of sound generally typical of real languages), which distinguishes it from gib-

berish; (b) meaninglessness; and (c) value as language to the speaker. Because some utterances apparently glossolalic occur in play, when the speaker knows that he is not talking a real language, we may want to be explicit by adding 'or a language surrogate' to the definition.

The omission of emotion and psychological state from the definition of glossolalia is deliberate, and the reasons are two. In the first place, such a word as "emotion" is much too vague to use in a technical term, for precisely when is a person emotional? There is even a danger that when we do not find the expected emotional characteristics in a person speaking in tongues, we attribute emotionality to him because of the utterances. In the second place, glossolalia does in fact occur when people are not at all wrought up. Not only does the Pentecostal stereotype no longer fit a large number of Pentecostal meetings, but the modern charismatic movement also deliberately plays down overt emotionalism. Much more investigation needs to be done on the correlation of psychological factors—for example, intelligence and personality types—to glossolalia. I doubt that any significant correlations will be found unless very specific kinds of behavior are the foci of study.

Xenoglossia

If glossolalia were identical with xenoglossia, there would be nothing of special interest to the linguist—unless, of course, the language spoken by an individual were one which was extinct. The scholar could then use this person as a source of information about that language. A Semiticist, for example, might give his right arm to learn something about what a Hebrew dialect sounded like before the present writing system was adopted! But if the language proved to be just a contemporary language, then the linguist, as a linguist, would lose interest in the case.¹⁰ The only other matter worthy of investigation would be to determine how the person acquired knowledge of the language. But this would be in the domain of psychology, including the study of extrasensory perception (ESP).

But xenoglossia and glossolalia are *not* identical. A case of xenoglossia would reveal a natural language, but a *glossa*¹¹ is never a natural language, and it is like a natural language only in very limited ways.

Even though the linguist is not particularly interested in xenoglossia, he is called upon from time to time to make judgments about the

authenticity of alleged cases of this phenomenon. For this reason we too must make some general remarks about its possibility and about how it is identified.

The layman considers xenoglossia to be miraculous. He is justified in having this belief, because all evidence leads to the conclusion that human language is learned behavior (Hockett 1963). Unlike other living creatures which use communicative signals, man inherits only the capacity to speak. This is saying a great deal, of course, for language is one trait which separates him a great distance from animals. Without it a human would never be able to break the code that is used by the people around him and begin to use it himself.

For the nonsupernaturalist, miracles do not occur, so he must either reject the possibility of xenoglossia or find other explanations for it. Two are available to him at the present time: psychic phenomena and cryptomnesia.

Parapsychological (psychic) phenomena are studied in connection with perception that does not appear to be mediated through usual ways. There are several forms of such "gifts." A paragnost, for example, is said to be able to locate a lost person or object after having observed something with which it was in contact. It is claimed that information conveyed to such a person transcends properties that we now call "physical," and if they are called "psychic," this is not to say that they are supernatural. Therefore a person convinced of the authenticity of parapsychological phenomena simply adds xenoglossia to his list.

The parapsychologist's chief concern, therefore, is to prove (a) that a person is indeed speaking a known language and (b) that the person never knew this language and had never had any contact with it. This is not a difficult undertaking, although it may at times be inconvenient. For example, it was once brought to the attention of the London Society for Psychical Research that there were two Englishmen who claimed to speak Temne. Since this is an African language spoken in Sierra Leone, they could not account for this knowledge. The speakers were sent to the School of Oriental and African Languages (at the University of London) where they were encouraged to talk in "Temne" with a real Temne present. The native speaker was categorical in his rejection of the language. A lengthy recording demonstrates, to my satisfaction, that the discourse was glossolalic.

While parapsychological explanations are not universally accepted by scholars (although some prefer to be skeptical rather than categor-

ical in their disbelief), they have no problem with *cryptomnesia* (that is, "hidden memory"). This is the appearance in the consciousness of thoughts which are considered to be original but which are only memories. In a clear case of cryptomnesia it would be demonstrated that a person did know or could very well have known what he now claimed not to know. But in many cases cryptomnesia is a better explanation than a parapsychological one (unless this statement merely reveals a bias). Here is one example. In one of his dreams, the eminent American anthropologist Robert W. Lowie had a conversation with someone who told him of a story by Edgar Allan Poe entitled "Daughter of Calixtus." In this story the daughter demanded that her father give her 1124 times as much money as he made. On awakening, Lowie was puzzled by the realization that Poe had never written such a story, and he did not know who Calixtus was. Informed by his wife that there were two popes of this name who lived in the 12th century, Lowie consulted a reference book which indicated that there was a Pope Calixtus whose Pontificate lasted only five years—1119 to 1124: Lowie comments: "The coincidence in the numbers is obvious, but I am at a loss as to how it can be explained" (1966:380; cf. Read 1967).

In talking about xenoglossia we must remember that most reports are made by uncritical people, many of whom are predisposed to believe in them. They have never been witnesses of a case of xenoglossia but have been told about it by somebody who knows. In short, we are given hearsay evidence, and we will always have as much difficulty in finding a bona fide witness as one does who tries to find a person who saw a sea monster. Therefore the frequent references to xenoglossia in the writings of Christian charismatists are nearly worthless as evidence to the incidence of this phenomenon. Their chief value is to illustrate the beliefs of the glossolalists.

It should be noted that an interesting feature of these reports is that they are often set in a certain frame. It consists of the following elements: On a certain occasion person A utters a glossic discourse which is identified by person B as being his own language, whereupon some witness to the event (including either A or B) takes it as a God-given sign for some kind of decision. This stereotypic kind of oral transmission of purported history requires its being considered a kind of folkloristic genre.

It should also be noted that reports about the content of xenoglossic and glossolalic utterances are strikingly different. When somebody

identifies an utterance as being in a known language, like German or Chinese, he refers only indirectly to its content; there is, as far as I know, no translation, as one would expect if the second person really knew the language. It is only with glossolalia that there is an "interpretation" (discussed below).

We are not to suppose, however, that it would be impossible to find someone who claims to have heard someone speak in a language he did not know. In this case the witness himself must be judged competent or incompetent to identify languages.

But by demonstrating a witness as incompetent we have not revealed him as a fraud. A person in good conscience might mistake a glossa, even his own, as a natural language because he tends to interpret a whole event in terms of some small part of it. For example, if a person heard, or thought he heard, Swahili words in what someone was saying, he would tend to "hear" a lot more as Swahili. This is clearly the case with Sango, a lingua franca of the Central African Republic. Europeans, particularly Frenchmen, think that the incidence of French words is so high in this language that it is really a kind of bastardized French. Statistical studies have revealed how wrong they are (see Taber 1965).

It is quite possible, of course, for a glossolalic discourse to consist of various kinds of linguistic material. It might, for example, have bits or stretches of a language unknown at the level of consciousness but recalled cryptomnesically, words or phrases from a language known by him (but unknown to all or most of the auditors), and glossic utterances of the kind defined for this study. Of such a discourse it would be unfair to ask a person "What language was spoken?" Nevertheless, people do, unconsciously or not, ask themselves this question. That the answer is not simply, "I don't know," is to be expected.¹²

In this section we have said that although xenoglossia is claimed by Christian charismatists to be part of the tongue-speaking experience, they would be unable to provide a case that would stand up to scientific investigation, and if it did, it would probably prove to be cryptomnesic.

Glossolalia

Having ruled out the possibility of charismatic xenoglossia, we are left with untold thousands of cases of unintelligible verbal utterances. If they are not known languages, are they unknown languages? That

is, could they possibly be specimens of some of the 4000-7000 languages spoken on earth which have not yet been studied? If they cannot be any of the human languages, what *are* the glossas? What *can* be said of them from a linguistic standpoint?

Not unknown languages. It is naive to suppose that because we are discovering new languages every year, glossas could be some of these undiscovered ones. In the first place, to "discover" languages is to speak metaphorically. What this means is, for example, that we learn that language A and language B are two different languages instead of one, as people had thought, because their speakers cannot understand each other even though the languages are obviously related (like some forms of Spanish and Portuguese); or that what had been known by a single name was in fact two different languages. It is because of this kind of increasing taxonomic precision that the number of languages in the world has been increasing. There are, of course, parts of the world which have not yet been fully explored. There we will find other people, and we can suppose that they will be speaking hitherto unknown languages.

In the second place, it is almost certain that whatever languages are "discovered," even in the case of new communities, they will resemble the ones around them. Thus, people working on languages of the Indians of the jungles of South America are not finding features which are startlingly different from those in already-known languages, and they are not changing our ideas about what human language is like.

For these reasons there is no justification whatsoever for pinning our hopes on future investigations to identify the glossas. We know enough now, even though our knowledge, like all knowledge, is still imperfect. It is on the basis of this knowledge that we assert that the glossas are not normal human languages even though they may reveal some of their characteristics.

A committed charmatist may not be shaken in his beliefs by the evidence which follows. If glossas are not like human languages, he may assert, as some have already done, that these are celestial languages.¹³ At this point the conversation between a glossolalist and a linguist could come to an abrupt end, for a scientist does not know, nor can he know, anything about celestial life. He cannot say anything about the similarity between glossas and the language of angels, for example, for he knows nothing about the latter; and neither does the glossolalist, he can point out.

The dialogue can be saved if the glossolalist is willing to broaden its scope to include the nature of communication systems in general, about which the linguist and other scientists know quite a bit. The conversation can be saved, of course, only if the glossolalist is willing to admit that what the scientist knows has some relevance to his assertions. At this point the participants in the conversation would be embarking on philosophical and metaphysical questions, but these are far beyond the scope of this present study.

Resemble some other special forms of speech. If glossic utterances are not natural languages, they represent a verbal activity which is continuous with only a few other verbal phenomena. It is yet to be demonstrated that there are parallels in certain forms of aphasia, in sleep-talking, in child speech, or among the mentally ill.¹⁴ If glossolalia occurred as a characteristic of a certain kind of human behavior or state of being, which comprehended more than being "filled with the Spirit," we might have heard of it. This is not to say, however, that glossolalia is a strictly Christian phenomenon. One nonreligious case has already been mentioned. Here are three more.

The first is that of a medium, a certain H  l  ne Smith (a fictitious name) whose remarkable case was thoroughly studied over a period of several years by the psychologist Thomas Flournoy at the end of the last century (see Flournoy 1900). In addition to speaking and writing in two "languages," using a non-Roman orthography of her invention, while in a trance state, she also produced utterances in circumstances too involved to describe here which, if we understand the investigator's description of them, were glossolalic.

The two other cases are from my own experience. One adult man in his fifties informed me that on one occasion when he was sixteen years old he burst out in a fit of anger at an older brother who had habitually taunted him. He remembers that, while speaking, he had no idea that he was not talking a language known to him (English, Yiddish, and Biblical Hebrew). It was only after he had stopped that he realized that he did not know what he had said. The experience was so bizarre that he wondered at the time if he had spoken a language of a preincarnation. Another man, now in his sixties, commonly uses glossolalia in a jocular way when, he says, he cannot express himself as he would like. The two examples he gave illustrated an apology and a burst of anger. Both were remarkably like other samples of glossolalia I have heard.¹⁵

Spoken phenomenon. Our present knowledge about glossolalia is based on impressions people have had on hearing glossas and on one phonological analysis of tape-recorded prayers (Wolfram 1966). The first-hand reports are usually very subjective, but they nonetheless give us valuable supplementary information. Many more descriptive studies are obviously needed. What prevents rapid advance in our knowledge of glossolalia cross-culturally is the difficulty of obtaining samples.

We must depend on tape-recordings for our analyses of glossas, because glossolalia is primarily an extemporaneous, unreflected, and spoken phenomenon.¹⁶ If this were always true, this fact would have to be incorporated in a definition of glossolalia. Or if Christian glossolalia, unlike some other forms of it, was never written, then we would have an indication of its role in Christianity. From the Christian's point of view there is no a priori reason why a glossolalic utterance may *not* be written; it would be completely compatible with some views of inspiration that produced the Scriptures. I do not think that it is the absence of any mention of written glossolalia in the Bible that prevents a Christian glossolalist from writing down his discourse. It may be the very nature of the phenomenon that makes writing incompatible with it.

Only one case of written glossolalia is known to me: that of Le Baron, mentioned above. He claims to have written down many messages—and poems—he got from his "psychic automatism," only a sample of which was ever published. A slightly different case is that of Simon, a German Pentecostalist at the beginning of this century, who dictated a few sentences to the psychologist investigator (Pfister 1912). Although we do not know as much as we should like about the way in which the glossic utterances were transcribed, we are led by these two cases to assume that there was either a slowing down in the formulation of the utterances or a recalling of what had been said. The first possibility is less likely because of the inability glossolalists are reported to exhibit in repeating—or even remembering—what they have uttered.

Meaningless. A glossa is always meaningless in the linguistic sense. That is, there are no consistent correlations between units of speech and experience. A glossolalist will not deny this observation. He insists, on the other hand, that a glossa has meaning because it *is* a language and because it can be interpreted. (The word "interpret" is taken from English versions of the Bible. The Greek verb is *dier-*

mēneuein διαρμηνεύειν, e.g., 1 Corinthians 14.5.) Interpretations do in fact take place, but they are usually pious exhortations in the language of the group where the glossic utterances are made. They are often strikingly longer or shorter than the glossic utterance. Never are they translations in the strict sense of the term; one would be unable to match the original text with the interpreted version.¹⁷ The glossologist nevertheless believes that the interpretation is as much a charism (a "gift" from God) as his own glossolalic utterance.

We cannot deny the possibility of their being *some* linguistic meaning. If certain segments tended to recur in a speaker's discourses, they might eventually be associated with certain concepts and even acquire a specific meaning. This is a hypothesis that occurred to me while comparing transcriptions of glossic texts with the original tape-recordings. It was confirmed by the discovery that a Pentecostalist preacher, known only as Pastor Paul, claimed that in his own glossas the word *ea* meant 'Jesus' (Lombard 1910:177).¹⁸ In time many other words might acquire meanings. What effect this "semantification" would have on the organization of a glossa must remain at this time a matter of conjecture.

Other kinds of "meaning" are, of course, possible. A speaker, for example, may report that certain glossic "words" from his own discourses remind him of objects or experiences. This was clearly the case with the above-mentioned Simon, whose meaning associations were reported in the only study of this kind known to me. There is some merit in this approach, for it may explain the linguistic source of some stretches of speech. On reflecting on an utterance of mine like *kashaskishmishom* I might imagine that it referred to something I used to enjoy when I was a lad. This "word," which was the first thing that occurred to me when I was once trying to generate a glossic utterance, is in fact the family name of a sweet, rich dish made of rice and raisins. Why it should arise in my consciousness on precisely that occasion is a psychological matter beyond the scope of this study, but it was the principal concern of Pfister's investigation of Simon's glossolalia.

There is also emotive or affective meaning associated with glossic discourses. We infer this from the general impression given by a discourse (e.g., prophetic, pleading, commanding, denunciatory, etc.) or by breath-groups within it. Thus, although the sample text provided below has many of the linguistic (e.g., intonational) and paralinguistic characteristics of a private prayer of the kind found in at least

some American groups, there is a considerable variety in the meanings evoked by separate breath-groups. For example: normal declarative (2), insistent (3), emphatic (6), commanding (14), pleading (18), despairing (20). These are, admittedly, my own interpretations based on signals which I respond to as a speaker of American English; we do not know how the speaker would characterize her own utterances. It is unlikely that there would be a great discrepancy between our interpretations if she were using material from a language that was native to both of us as is clearly the case. For example, the two utterances of [yámana kita] in (1) and (2) contrasted very neatly in the way that *I love him so much* and *I love him so much* do in a certain intonational paradigm. Likewise [yasánaki] (19) is said exactly as one would *Ramona, dear* if Ramona were being called tenderly.

If a glossa is meaningless, this does not mean that it is gibberish. There is something onomatopoeic about the verb "gibber" which makes it incompatible with most glossolalic utterances. The principal linguistic feature which distinguishes them from gibberish is the remarkable number of phonological units at various levels. Starting with the highest level, one finds macrosegments (comparable to sentences), microsegments (comparable to "words"), syllables, and sound units (comparable to phonemes). The microsegments are separated from each other by pauses of greater or lesser duration and are characterized by certain configurations consisting of stress and pitch. In other words, one can analyze the English sentence *I'm going to New York today* and the following glossic macrosegment similarly:

yámana kítə siyanáyasi

Acute accent marks strong stress and the horizontal lines indicate pitch levels. The vowel [ə] is the same as in the unstressed last syllable of *sofa*.

Since microsegments are isolable, it is possible to compare them with each other and to describe their distribution with respect to the other segments within the macrosegment.¹⁹ Thus, even a cursory examination of the sample text reveals that *siyanáyasi* occurs only at the end of a macrosegment and is very often preceded by *kíta*. In other words, glossic syllables are not simply spewed out in a haphazard sort of way; there is in each glossa a kind of microsegmental syntax similar to that of natural languages.

Glossic words, it must be understood, are difficult to determine: in the absence of clues given by meaning, a person transcribing a glossic text is left to subtle phonological cues, but his segmentation of the macrosegment into smaller units will depend in considerable part on the prejudices that he brings to the task. Therefore a single text will very likely have as many different transcriptions—if only different in one place—as there are people who attempt the task. One must not suppose that the person responsible for the text is any better qualified to segment it, even if we assume that some stretches of the text are meaningful to him. For example, Gbeya people of the Central African Republic who were learning to write in their own language tended to write *weni* (*wen* + *i*) 'the word' as *we ni* and *fod* (*fo* + *á*) 'pushed' as *fo wa*.

Repetitious. On close examination glossas are different from natural languages by being simple and repetitious. Stated differently, they have a smaller number of linguistic units with a much higher incidence of some of them. The sample text illustrates both of these features. It has as consonants only *p*, *t*, *k*, *m*, *n*, *s*, and *y*; as vowels only *i*, *a*, and [ə], which seems to be a variant of *a*. (For further comments on this weak vowel see the sample text.) Thus, if *i* and *a* are the only two significant vowels, there are altogether only nine basic sounds in this glossa. Moreover, only the following syllables occur:

<i>a</i>	<i>ta</i>	—	<i>ma</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>sa</i>	<i>ya</i>
<i>i</i>	<i>ti</i>	<i>ki</i>	—	<i>ni</i>	<i>si</i>	—

The absence of the syllables *ka*, *mi*, and *yi* in the inventory is not significant in itself, because languages commonly fail to utilize their resources to the fullest extent.

Repetitiousness occurs at all levels, from the recurrence of whole macrosegments to the high incidence of certain syllables, which itself entails a high incidence of their constituent sounds. Thus, in our text notice the frequency of the microsegment *siyanáyasi* and the syllable *na*. As might be expected, a preference for certain sounds gives to a glossa its exotic flavor.

There is repetitiousness also at the level of the macrosegment, a fact already alluded to in mentioning the position of the microsegment *siyanáyasi*. This characteristic is revealed in less diversity at the end of a macrosegment than at the beginning; the greatest diversity occurs within this unit.

Glossas compared with each other

The foregoing comments about glossas comprehended all of them, but the only characteristics mentioned were those that one might find in studying one glossa at a time as if it were a sample of a real language. When glossas are compared with each other, other features emerge.²⁰

Asymmetrical sound grids. The asymmetry is revealed by the frequent absence of sounds where one might expect them in an articulatory chart. Thus, when the consonants of our sample text are displayed, we have the following:

—	t	k	
m	n	—	
—	s	—	

In other words, one stop, one nasal, and two fricatives are missing. They might be: *p*, *ŋ* (like "ng" of *sing*), *f*, and *x* (like "ch" of German *ach*). Such asymmetries do, of course, occur in natural languages, but one does not find them with such regularity, and to the same degree, as one does in glossolalia.

Simple syllable structure. This feature is considered here, as a characteristic of glossas in general, because there is no reason why some glossas could not have phonologically complex syllables. Thus, there is no intrinsic difference between the syllables in our sample text and those in the following sentence from Swahili:

Watoto wataka kucheza barabarani

'The children want to play in the road.'

The syllables here are all open (that is, end with a vowel), and all start with a single consonant. The digraph "ch" represents a single sound, but Swahili does have phonetically complex unit sounds, like *mb*, and a few consonant clusters. What is significant about all glossas in general, however, is their preference for syllables of the shape Consonant + Vowel (that is, CV). Some closed syllables (ending with a consonant) do occur (i.e., CVC), but consonant clusters seem to be infrequent. In this glossa, therefore, we do not get syllables of the shape *nis*, *skats*, and *smins*, and we do not have microsegments of the shape *ksinstant*.

High incidence of i and a. The most common vowels of glossas are *i* and *a*. They not only occur in all inventories, whereas other vowels may or may not (as in our sample glossa) be present, but they are

also of higher frequency in any single glossa. In the count of relative frequencies in the speech of three persons done by my student W. Wolfram, these two vowels have the following percentages. (The top figure in each case is the percentage of vowels with respect to consonants.) It is quite likely, however, that the figures for *a* are lower than the ones recorded here because of the error of having heard the weak central vowel (i.e., the "a" of *sofa*) as the low vowel here represented by *a*.

	Of 52.32%	Of 47.77%	Of 44.83%
<i>a</i>	19.63%	14.93%	22.73%
<i>i</i>	18.13%	10.73%	5.37%

No similar generalization is available at the present time with respect to the consonants.

Compared with the speakers' native languages

When a glossa is compared with the native language of its speaker, it is seen to be both derivative and innovative. It is derivative, because both its inventory of sounds and its prosodic patterns (the intonational contours that make up the macrosegments) are taken from his first language. This fact is illustrated below, where the consonant phonemes of one glossa are superimposed in boldface on an articulatory chart of the distinctive consonant sounds (i.e., phonemes) of English:

p		t	ch (<i>church</i>)	k	
b		d	j (<i>gip</i>)	g	
	f	th (<i>thigh</i>)	s	sh (<i>shoe</i>)	h
	v	th (<i>thy</i>)	z	zh (<i>azure</i>)	ng (<i>sing</i>)
m		n			w r y

In other words, all of the consonants which occur are those which occur in English, and only six English phonemes are not represented in this glossa.²¹

The chart above, which would fit at least in part several other natural languages of the world, does not reveal another significant fact of glossic borrowing. It is that the sounds are, in the case of speakers of English, entirely typical of that language. In other words, a glossolalist's "accent" gives him away as a native-speaker of English. We find, for example, that his voiceless stops are aspirated (that is, are followed by a slight puff of air), as with the first sound of *Paul*.

We would expect this sound to be unaspirated in the glossa of a native-speaker of French, because voiceless stops in that language are always unaspirated. Moreover since varieties of languages are differentiated in their sound patterns, we expect to find dialectal features carried over in glossas. If the vowel [æ] occurred in the glossas from people representing different parts of the United States, we would expect it to be typical of those areas. A "Southerner" might say [æ^h] and someone from western Massachusetts [æ], as in *man*.

In talking about the similarities between a glossa and the language of its speaker, we are doing so in a technical way. We do not expect a layman to make as good a guess as a linguist; the linguist knows what to look for, the layman does not. Nevertheless, objective observers, from William James, the psychologist, to Weston La Barre, the anthropologist who investigated the snake-handling Pentecostal cult in the American Southeast, have remarked on the derivative nature of glossas.

The innovative features of a glossa are to be found primarily in the way sounds are borrowed. It is the units which are borrowed, not the patterns. Two examples will illustrate this point. In American English both /t/ and /d/ have "tapped" variants (i.e., allophones) when they occur between vowels and are preceded by primary stress. Thus, in the words *batty* and *laddy* the sounds after the first vowel are not phonetically [t] and [d] at all. Compare the sounds of those words with [t] and [d] in the words *bat/lad* and *tabby/dally*. This pattern does not hold in the glossas we have examined: [t^h] occurs where we expect [ṭ], as in the "word" *kita* in our sample text, and [ṭ] occurs freely in other American glossas as an independent sound unit, like a new phoneme.²²

The other innovating features are the simplification of syllable structure, the increase in the frequency of some sounds, and borrowing from languages other than English. We have already mentioned the first two features when glossas were viewed as if they were independent languages. They certainly make glossas look strikingly different from English. Borrowing from other languages occurs when the speaker has had contact with a language other than the one he normally speaks. This can be proven when the speaker is available for questioning; we can also make fairly good guesses when we know something of his history. An American about forty years old with the name Thorvald Johnson might be expected to have heard Swedish in his youth, for example. We have to allow for some cases of cryptom-

nesic recall and for really novel sounds. Of the first type might be the occurrence of liprounded vowels like Swedish *y* or German *ü*. Of the latter type might be a backed *k*, like the Arabic sound represented by "q" in Roman transliteration. It is not impossible that some sounds, like this *k*, are produced accidentally when a person's vocal tract is subjected to stimuli beyond his control; it is not uncommon for people to report involuntary motor events in connection with their first experience in glossolalia. One man told me that his throat felt "rough" when he first spoke in tongues.

Glossas as artificial languages

In the foregoing we have seen that glossas are not natural languages, and they are unlike natural languages in very significant ways even though features are shared. How is this similarity and dissimilarity to be explained? I would suggest, as a reasonable hypothesis, that the speaker is subconsciously motivated to produce a new language. To do this he must make it as different from his own as he possibly can, but since his resources are only those of the linguistic habits he has already stored up, he is as limited to them as is a painter who works with only three colors. Some people are more creative with what they have, as would be some painters. We should not be surprised at the linguistic "creations" of some glossolalists, although we are justified in being awed by them. Witness the languages created by the medium Hélène Smith, a truly remarkable performance by someone whom one would not consider a linguistic genius.

There are, however, not too many similarities between the production of glossas and the creation of artificial languages in other contexts.²³ The difference is due to the way in which glossas are produced: extemporaneously and rapidly, using only the vocal channel. This is a very difficult requirement to impose on someone who sets out to produce utterances which resemble language. The fact that it can be done at all gives further evidence to man's linguistic capacities. For this reason we may find the examination of glossolalia instructive in the study of language universals (see below).

Implications of glossolalia to the study of language universals

Glossas have been rejected as natural languages, but this was not done in any rigorous way. That is, we did not start with a definition of natural human language and then show how a glossa failed to meet criteria implied in the definition. This will now be done in a

somewhat superficial way with the purpose of suggesting that an attempt to apply a criteria test to glosses, particularly one based on strong hypotheses about language universals, would lead to a better understanding of both human language and glossolalia.

One reasoned attempt at characterizing language is that of Charles F. Hockett.²⁴ He suggests sixteen defining features as universals of language design (hence called "design-features"). These "are found in every language on which we have reliable information, and each seems to be lacking in at least one known animal communicative system" (1963:6). The latter are brought into the discussion, we assume, because of the refusal to distinguish, a priori, animal from human systems and because of the nonsupernaturalist assumption in the continuity of human and animal life. These features are the following:

1. *Vocal-auditory channel*: The channel for all linguistic communication is vocal-auditory.
2. *Broadcast transmission [sic] are directional reception*: All linguistic signals are transmitted, broadcast, and received directionally.
3. *Rapid fading*: All linguistic signals are evanescent.
4. *Interchangeability*: Adult members of any speech community are interchangeably transmitters and receivers of linguistic signals.
5. *Complete feedback*: The transmitter of a linguistic signal himself receives the message.
6. *Specialization*: The direct-energetic consequences of linguistic signals are usually biologically trivial; only the triggering effects are important.
7. *Semanticity*: Linguistic signals function in correlating and organizing the life of a community because there are associative ties between signal elements and features in the world; in short, some linguistic forms have denotations.
8. *Arbitrariness*: The relation between a meaningful element in language and its denotation is independent of any physical or geometrical resemblance between the two.
9. *Discreteness*: The possible messages in any language constitute a discrete repertory rather than a continuous one.
10. *Displacement*: Linguistic messages may refer to things remote in time or space, or both, from the site of the communication.

11. *Openness*: New linguistic messages are coined freely and easily.
12. *Tradition*: The conventions of a language are passed down by teaching and learning, not through the germ plasm.
13. *Duality (of patterning)*: Every language has both a cenematic [phonological] subsystem and plerematic [grammatico-lexical] subsystem.
14. *Prevarication*: Linguistic messages can be false, and they can be meaningless in the logician's sense.
15. *Reflexiveness*: In a language, one can communicate about communication.
16. *Learnability*: A speaker of a language can learn another language.

Ten of these properties constitute a defining set for language, according to Hockett: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13. Feature 7, semanticity, is implied by 8; and every human language also has 14 and 15.

Glossas, by this standard, are not human languages, primarily because they really are not systems of communication. They are not characterized by semanticity (7), arbitrariness (8), displacement (10), prevarication (14), and reflexiveness (15). This list is probably incomplete, but the absence of these features is sufficient to demonstrate the nonlinguisticity of glossas.

Other implications of glossolalia

The linguistic aspects of glossolalia have been briefly summarized in this study. A great deal more analytical and comparative work needs to be done. Knowledge gained from such studies would surely be of considerable value to psychologists and linguists. Only a couple of points are mentioned here.

Linguists are concerned not only with describing languages but also—in fact, especially—with understanding what makes it possible for man to use language. To put it in other words: What is the nature of man's language-creating ability? It can only be inferred from what we observe man doing; we cannot "get into" his head, and even if we could it is doubtful that we would learn anything. The usual approach is to examine the output which meets up to criteria established in his language, that is, "what makes sense" ("grammatical," as the linguist would put it without meaning what the school teacher means by the term). But the linguist will surely learn something about man's linguistic capacities by examining his nongram-

mathematical output. We may find, for example, that instead of being simply a deformation of a language already known, a nontypical utterance like a glossolalic one reveals something fundamental in speech. We will not find out without trying. Moreover, a comprehensive linguistic theory must ultimately account for all such abnormal utterances.

For psychology I suggest glossolalia as a subject for investigation because of what light it might shed on the use of speech as an expression of the ineffable. Hitherto the functions of language have been stated in terms of natural languages in all their forms. It would seem, however, that man has a compulsion from time to time to utilize his sound-making capacities in unconventional ways. If it can be demonstrated that these emotive utterances, although spontaneous and unlearned (that is, not passed from one person to another), have more than coincidental similarities, then we will have learned something about man's innate response to his own nature.

Epilogue

In the foregoing discussion I have tried to distinguish what we know about glossolalia from what we do not know or are uncertain about. My strongest assertion has been that glossas are not like human languages. I want now to make another assertion: We are not justified in saying that people who experience glossolalia are fundamentally or temporarily in an abnormal psychological condition. So much calumny has been heaped upon them that we feel obliged, if for no other reasons than humane ones, in calling for tolerance and understanding. Moreover, there is evidence to indicate that for many people glossolalia is a cathartic experience (which is not without its implications to psycholinguistics). I would go one step further and claim that a glossolalist's religious experience can be as genuine as another man's.

Let us further recognize that the glossolalist who cooperates with a sympathetic investigator in the study of this interesting phenomenon is making an extremely important contribution to man's understanding of himself, both as a talking and religious creature. We need his assistance and hope that he will tolerate our critical approach to the study of a phenomenon that is at the core of his religious experience, so that together we might "increase in wisdom."²⁵

NOTES

¹This term, not a creation of my own, is used here with the meaning "that which is characteristic of linguistic structure." The purpose of this study is to suggest ways in which glossolalia is and is not like natural language.

There is no resemblance between this paper and another one of mine by the same title which was delivered at the annual meeting of the Koninklijke Zuidnederlandse Maatschappij voor taal- en Letterkunde en Geschiedenis in Bruxelles, 1967.

This study was written primarily to answer the question, "What do *you* [that is I, the linguist] think about glossolalia?" The poser of the question may be a believer in the phenomenon or he may be someone who cannot take it seriously; in either case he is probably not acquainted with general linguistics. A psychologist, an anthropologist, or another linguist would pose different questions, and he would make up his own mind about glossolalia on the basis of what data he could obtain. If this paper does not give him all the information he wants, perhaps there is enough for him to ask the kinds of questions which will eventually lead to an even better understanding of the phenomenon.

²Unless otherwise indicated, all technical terms found in this study are in rather general use. My only neologism is *glossa*, which will be defined later. The terms *glossolalist* and *charismatic*, when talking about religious glossolalia, are synonymous, although in some contexts the latter term has a broader connotation. Thus, one talks about "the modern charismatic movement" whose representatives distinguish themselves from the Pentecostals. Although both groups are glossolalist, charismatics are members of the Catholic church and various Protestant denominations whereas Pentecostals consider themselves members of other, specifically charismatic, denominations. Protestant glossolalia is well documented. For a brief report about charismatic activity in Catholic circles see *Voice* (organ of the Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship International), July-August, 1967.

³The word glossolalia (or *glossolaly*) must not be related to *lalling* (or *lallation*) in spite of the similarity in form. On the other hand, the meanings of *glossolalia* and *speaking in tongues* are identical, regardless of the distinction which some people have suggested. The latter expression, now a technical one, is a somewhat literal translation of the Greek and does not make much sense in ordinary English. The original expression is *lalein glōssē* λαλεῖν γλώσση, translated in the singular in the AV as "speak in an (unknown) tongue" and in the plural (with *glōssais* γλώσσαις) as "speak with tongues."

⁴If he is also interested in socio- or psycholinguistics, he will, however, be concerned with the motivations that lead to glossolalia. For example, he may want to explain why glossolalia is usually associated with religious behavior and more often within the Christian religion than in others. The most probable explanation is that the New Testament provides the incentive for talking in tongues. People who have not heard of it or who, hearing about it, do not take it seriously, are less likely to practice it. Of course, some people experience glossolalia outside of a religious context, as will be seen, and do not associate their behavior with biblical speaking in tongues.

⁵Without giving a catalogue of the functions attributed to the gift by glossolalists themselves, we might mention that whereas early in the history of Pentecostalism, that is, at the beginning of this century, it was believed that languages were given to people to permit them to go abroad as missionaries, today, at least among many of the recent charismatics, the emphasis is on private use in prayer. For the latter, scriptural validation is found in Romans 8:26: "We do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words" (RSV).

⁶Glossolalists have recognized the existence, or the possibility, of non-Christian speaking in tongues, for example, in Spiritism or by people who, other evidence may have borne out, were not really "baptized in the Spirit." This kind of glossolalia they call a "Satanic counterfeit." The term "counterfeit" does not imply any imperfection in the verbal product as we use the term for counterfeit money, for example, which fails to meet up to standard. I have never heard of

anyone's rejecting a glossolalic discourse because it failed to meet some linguistic criteria. In fact, linguistic observations by charismatists about glossolalia are uncommon, and even when they occur, they are extremely superficial.

⁷I refer to the serious investigators. There is as much difference between the scholar and the naive devotee of psychic phenomena as there is between the space scientist and the naive believer in unidentified flying objects. The American Society for Psychical Research (880 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10021) publishes a quarterly journal now in its 68th year.

⁸The survey by May (1956) for this reason should be used with discretion. It impresses one as being a potpourri of different kinds of abnormal behavior.

⁹This specimen, reproduced (with probable typographical error) from Sundkler with a rearrangement into five instead of two lines, is not a phonetic transcription but merely an attempt to give an impression of what the "tongue" sounded like. It is therefore possible that more or less well-articulated syllables occurred only in the English words. Another person may have described this utterance as consisting of "sounds like those made when a person is shivering with cold" and "a kind of stuttering sound."

¹⁰In this paper the term linguist is used in the technical sense: he is a scientific linguist or a linguistic scientist, which is saying the same thing, for his field of specialization is the discipline of linguistics. Not all "linguists" who have been consulted about glossolalia are of this type, because laymen still use the word to refer to someone who have a reputation for knowing several languages.

¹¹I introduce this term to mean: (a) an alleged "language," represented by a particular glossolalic discourse; (b) a specimen, either written down or mechanically recorded, of this "language." Since one cannot say a priori that an individual's glossolalic utterances are all of the same type, he may speak several *glossas*. The adjectival form of *glossa* will be *glossic*, although *glossal* was used on at least one occasion by another writer.

¹²It would not be too difficult to devise an experiment whereby subjects were asked to identify what language was spoken in tape-recorded texts concocted of glossolalia (real or artificial) and real and/or pseudo-Zulu, for example.

¹³It is claimed that in the apposition of "tongues of men and of angels" there is a reference to glossolalia, because this phrase (in 1 Corinthians 13:1) occurs in a section of Paul's epistle devoted to the use of the "spiritual gifts," and of glossolalia in particular.

¹⁴This assertion is put in a strong form in the hope that others will either confirm or invalidate it. It may only reflect my present ignorance of the literature of clinical psychology. For example, Julius Laffal writes (personal communication) that he has tape recordings from two [schizophrenic] patients "which clearly illustrate glossolalia."

¹⁵It was extremely interesting that the two utterances, given less than a minute apart, were phonologically different, as far as I could tell without having a tape-recording of them. In other words, they were like two different *glossas*. A description of this nonreligious glossolalia is being done under my supervision.

¹⁶But it is not, by definition, a concomitant of an *altered state of consciousness* nor some kind of automatic behavior. Whereas a trance state can accompany the charismatic religious experience, it is certainly not necessary. *Automatisms*, according to William James, are either sensory or motor, emotional or intellectual, and are due to 'uprushes' into the ordinary consciousness of energies originating in the subliminal parts of the mind (1958:189). He gives, as examples, hallucinations, pains, convulsions, and paralyzes of feeling and of motion. A common motor automatism is the trembling of one's hand during a fit of anger. If glossolalia is an automatism, the use of the term may require modification.

¹⁷Although matchings do not seem possible, we might find some interesting correlations in making comparisons of a *glossic* text and the speaker's own interpretation of it. There might, for example, be more similarities in frequency counts than one would expect at random. Even though a certain *glossic* "word" and, say, *love*—in the interpretation—could not be found in comparable places in the texts,

it would be more than coincidental if both of them occurred in the neighborhood of twenty-three times. If several such correlations could be established, we would be justified in assuming that the glossic words had meaning. This suggestion is pure conjecture, for we have not had the proper kind of texts for this kind of study. What a cryptanalyst would observe in a glossic text we do not yet know.

Some groups of charismatists, following the injunction of 1 Corinthians 14:27, permit speaking in tongues only if there is an interpretation and no more than three such occurrences in a single meeting. Presumably a person would not speak unless he intended on giving his own interpretation or unless he knew that there was someone in the audience who would do it for him. The interpreters, for their part, might feel obliged—for example, out of loyalty to the speaker—to give the interpretation.

¹⁹Having "discovered" the meaning of *ea*, the speaker said that he tried to say 'my Jesus' and 'dear Jesus' (in German, of course) while speaking in tongues, and he observed that in each case a different glossic word preceded *ea*. Although unsophisticated linguistic observations such as these cannot be taken at face value, they do provide us with interesting information. What is clearly revealed here, for example, is the naive view that another language will be like one's own native language. In this glossa a "noun" *ea* was preceded by its attributive, as it would be in German. Similarly, Hélène Smith's Martian and Hindu "languages" were copies of French.

²⁰The susceptibility of a glossa to analysis is attested by the attempts of Mr. Le Baron to identify the relationship of his own glossa to some known language. He appears to have made a complete concordance (or index) of the "words" in his language, only a portion of which are presented, in alphabetical order, in the article already referred to.

²¹Any generalizations about glossas at the present time must be qualified by the statement that they are spoken by people whose native language was English. Although glossolalia is reported to occur among people speaking other, and non-Indo-European, languages, no truly cross-linguistic study has yet been undertaken. The only non-English samples we have are those of German and French; I have also heard, but not recorded, glossolalia among speakers of Dutch, in Holland.

Another qualification must state that all generalizations ignore the ages of the glossas. This is a significant limitation, because of the probability, as we have already observed, that glossas evolve the more and the longer they are used. On the other hand, it has been observed that speakers appear to use the same basic inventory of phonological units over a period of weeks, with the exception of sounds of low frequency which may be absent from one or more sample texts (Wolfram 1966). Other correlates must also be taken into consideration, such as age, sex, linguistic aptitude of the speaker (as measured by his control of his own language and/or his ability to learn other languages), emotional stability, and so on.

²²Since cross-linguistic studies have not yet been made, we cannot be sure that the similarity between the sound-inventory of a glossa and, say, English is pure borrowing. There may be a tendency for some kinds of sounds to be sifted out from all phonological systems. The chart is adapted from Wolfram.

²³Perhaps the speaker is introducing a sound from another language, but we do not know what languages other than English she has been exposed to. H. A. Gleason, Jr. suggested in a conversation that glossolalia might be syllabified speech. He pointed out that in one case of aphasic speech personally observed by him there was strong syllabification, with each syllable being said as if in isolation: for example, *it is im-ma-te-ri-al*. Further comparisons with aphasic speech must be made with caution. It should be noted, for example, that glossolalia can be spoken as rapidly and easily as ordinary English.

²⁴Even the neologisms of schizophrenics are different from what we find in glossolalia, for their emphasis is on esoteric meanings. Their use of phonological changes seems to be minimal.

²⁵There are two studies, 1960 and 1963, the former of which is more complete. I have used the 1963 version here.

The tentative nature of these and all other generalizations about language universals is underlined by Hockett: "Hypotheses, about language universals or anything else, are by definition proposals to be knocked down, not beliefs to be defended" (1963:6).

²²Since the completion of this manuscript (September, 1967) my own research on glossolalia has continued rather intensively. New texts have been collected and are being processed. Several interviews with glossolalists have been held on the linguistics aspects of glossolalia. On the basis of these interviews a linguistic questionnaire has been prepared for a mail-survey. One experiment was conducted, successfully, to induce nonreligious glossolalia in a college class room. The present study must be considered a tentative one. It was originally written at the request of John P. Kildahl, Chief Psychologist at the Lutheran Medical Center (Brooklyn, N.Y.), now Professor of Pastoral Theology at the New York Theological Seminary. It was Dr. Kildahl's research project on the "Relationships between glossolalia and mental health" (subsidized by the U.S. Public Health Service, grant number MH 10514-01, 1964) that received so much publicity—much of it erroneous—in the religious press. An earlier version of this paper, bearing very little resemblance to the present one, was read by Rev. David Thompson, Eugene Schramm, and Dr. Donald N. Larson. This paper was read by Dr. Henry Allan Gleason, Jr. All of their help is gratefully acknowledged.

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SAMPLE TEXT OF GLOSSOLALIA

The following is a sample of religious glossolalia recorded voluntarily at prayer by a girl of about twenty years of age. She had been speaking in tongues for a year. The original tape-recording is a part of W. Wolfram's collection. The quasi-phonetic transcription that is used here is my own. (The lines in English are in standard orthography.) Each numbered line represents a breath-group, and the pauses between them, unless otherwise specified, are rather equal in length. The commas indicate pauses of a different nature; for one thing, the pitch levels are sustained, rather than falling. The vowel *a* is of the "Italian variety" (and is found in some American pronunciations of *father*; but not in Boston, for example); the vowel *e* is that of the English words *but*, *run*, or the last syllable in *sofa*. (Linguists operate with another unstressed vowel, as in the first unstressed syllable of some pronunciations of *today*, but in this transcription the distinction between these two weak vowels is ignored.) The vowel *i* is also like that of English, resembling the vowels of *see* and *city* (the second syllable). There are two exceptions: The last vowels of (16) and (22) are intermediate between those of *see* and *say*.

The consonants *t* and *k* are aspirated as they would be as first members of stressed syllables: e.g., *tea-pot*, *key-chain*. Therefore the *t* in *kita* is not pronounced as in *beat 'em*. This distribution of an aspirated consonant is in violation of the usual American pattern. It is more like the inter-vocalic British *t* as in that pronunciation of *Betty* and *latitude* (the first *t*).

There appear to be two degrees of stress: primary (/) and reduced (^), both placed on the syllable. Since there is a correlation between the placement of reduced stress and "word" length, it would be possible from a linguistic point of view to describe this glossa as having only one stress per word. Syllables not marked are, of course, unstressed by comparison. On the other hand, some syllables get extra stress which is also accompanied by greater volume. The incidence of this stress is probably to be explained by intonational and emotional factors, not linguistic ones in the strictest sense.

The speaker is from New England. This is revealed by the quality of the vowel in the word *am* (14). In this area, for example, Hartford, Connecticut and Springfield, Massachusetts, the vowel (like that of *cat*) is preceded by a very short vowel like what one finds in the first part of the diphthong in some forms of *fate*.

1. yá-mə-nə kí-tə sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
2. yá-mə-nə kí-tə sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
3. à-nə-kí-yá-nə tí-ya-sa-ná-ya a-na-kí-yá-ta-na, sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
4. à-sa-kí-nə, à-na-kí-sa, à-sa-kí-yá-na tí-yə-ná-yə-sì.
5. yá-mə-nə kí-ta, sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
6. sí-nə kí-yá-na tí-ya-ná-yə-sí.
7. à-ma-kí-ta sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
8. sí-na kí-yá-ma, kí-tə, sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
9. sí-nə kí-nə à-sa-kí-yá-nə, à-na-kí-tə á-yə, à-na-kí-tə á-yə,
à-ma-kí-ta sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
10. Dó nóť deny mé.
11. á-na-kí-tə sí-yə-ná-yə-sí.
12. Dó not deny me.
13. à-sa-kí-nə sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
14. á-mə-kí-tə sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
15. Í ám your léader.
16. sì-nə-kí-ta sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
17. à-sa-kí-ta sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
18. yá-mə-nə kí-ta, yá-mə-nə kí-ta.
19. ya-sá-nə-kí, à-na-kí-yá-nə tí-yə-ná-yə-sì.
20. yá-mə-nə sí-ta, yà-nə-kí-ta sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
21. à-ma-kí-ta sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.
22. ì-nə-kí-ta, ì-na-kí-ta yá-ma, à-na-kí-yá-na, à-na-kí-sa nì-ya-náy.
23. à-sa-kí-yá-na, à-sa-kí-yá-na, à-ma-kí-ta sì-yə-ná-yə-sì.